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THE IDEAL OF PEACE
The present temper of peace-loving America is very close to
that of a nation on the brink of war. There is something in it
almost baffling to one who has thought of his countrymen as a
people to be saved from excess by a cool humour. No doubt
their moral sympathies have been deeply stirred by the present
conflict. Many of their prepossessions have been shocked, and
one at least has been quite shattered. It had been hoped in many
quarters that the age of war had passed, that international
understanding and economic interdependence had made an open
breach between the Christian nations of Europe an improbability
if not an impossibility. There is small doubt that it is the violation of this recently cherished ideal of peace that has stirred
America. Nothing else could account for the eagerness with
which she has overlooked the remoter and more real causes of
the war, ignored its justice or injustice, and sought for the immediate aggressor. Whether her findings even in this matter
have been based on unprejudiced information is beside the present
point. She has looked for the aggressor with honest intentions;
and believing with a fair degree of unanimity that Germany was
guilty of breaking the peace, she has, as a people, centred her
surprising animosity upon that nation.
It is not only surprising but perhaps a little inconsistent for
America to have felt animosity at all. Our case is different from
that of any of the belligerent peoples in just the essential fact that
our feelings are beside the point. With them it is a matter of
love of country, of national honour, of the defence of national
policies and ideals. The animus that possesses them has use
in the temper of their defence or their aggression. But in America
all such passion is wasted. It results in no action. It results
only in the curious spectacle of a militant spirit in behalf of
peace, and a windy partisanship in behalf of one of the warring
parties.
Since our feelings can be to so little purpose, the logical attitude would seem to be to keep our thinking clear and right. No
other exercise of our faculties can be of any service to the world or
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to ourselves. But just this clear and right thinking that might
have been so valuable seems to have been perverted by the very
animosity that is so futile. Instead of first establishing a
principle and proceeding to weigh all the nations by it impartially,
we seem first to have established a prejudice and proceeded to
lay about us for' every semblance of ground to support our
partisanship.
We have grasped, for example, at the idea of militarism;
naturally enough, for militarism traverses our ideals of national
life and our doctrine of peace. If that is really our principle of
judgment there may be reason in it. But we have used it, not to
support our judgment, but to feed our prejudice. In principle
there is no difference between navalism and militarism; and yet
we have taken England's armed dominance of the seas, and her
navy bigger than any two foreign navies, for granted, even with
a kind of pride, while German militarism, needed for identical
purposes-to guard her own-we have held up to execration.
We show, moreover, no abhorrence of Russian militarism, far
more brutal than that of Germany, or of French militarism, which
bites into the national life of France far more cruelly than that
of Germany into German life. We hate German militarism for
its temptation to aggression; and yet Germany is the only one of
the fighting nations that since her formation in 1871 has not
made aggressions. We concede without hesitation that Russia
may go to the help of her Servian brothers, though she had more
Slav brothers in Austria which she attacked than in Servia
which she came to help; and in the same breath we decry Germany for going to the help of her Austrian brothers. We extol
France for keeping to her treaty agreements with Russia; and
we execrate Germany for not breaking her treaty agreements
with Austria. The very efficiency of the German army, its readiness to act at the points of danger, at the moment of call, we
have held against her, though the current phrase on all our lips,
the shibboleth in every branch of our activity, is that same
efficiency. "
Such laxity of thought is anomalous in itself in a country
whose only vital function in relation to the war is to keep its
thinking clear and right. But it is a more serious anomaly,
though a more subtle one, as a side-light upon war in general and
upon that current ideal of universal peace that was so brutally
shocked by the outbreak of hostilities. It may be said that
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universal peace is an ideal to be pursued with faith and· hope
from afar; and it is, indeed, no reproof to an ideal that it is
lodged in infinite distance, perhaps ultimately unattainable.
But to claim our allegiance an ideal ought to be rational. It is
logical to ask that it should conform to the nature of things.
And it is just because this one seems not to conform that I question whether the thinking that lies behind it is any more clear
and right than the thinking that is called up to the support of
the current prejudice. I question whether there are not elements too deeply grounded in this "nature of things" to make
it aught but ridiculous for us to have based our animosity on
the breach of this recent ideal.
For in point of fact it is reasonable to doubt whether for all
our late professions we really have a belief in peace as a sacred
principle. That we love peace and its ease and comforts is
unquestioned. That we abhor war for its own sake is a virtue
that we may pray to preserve. But we have not as a nation or in
any considerable numbers discredited either our Revolutionary
or our Civil War. We thought differently from England on the
subject of taxation, and we fought to free ourselves from her.
We thought differently from the South on the subject of slavery,
and we fought to keep her from freeing herself from us. In both
wars we were successful. Who was right is immaterial. Both
instances exemplified the principle of war-the failure of two
peoples to think alike, the extreme certainty of justice on both
sides, the unwillingness to compromise, the willingness to die
that the idea might prevail. In both cases we violated the ideal
of peace, and made our ideas of right prevail by force of arms.
And we have not repented either our separation from England
or our abolition of slavery.
Indeed, to be believers in the principle of peace we should
have to go much farther than to profess a regret at past wars.
The principle of war is the principle of force. If we disbelieve
in that principle, as for example Tolstoi disbelieved in it, not
shallowly, but with fearless, penetrating minds, we must disbelieve as he did in all manifestations of government. For all
government is based on force. The whole sanction of governmental authority is the physical compulsion it can exercise-its
armed power to seize property, to deprive of liberty, to kill.
Someone disagrees with the established ideas of the powerful
many; he acts on his own insurgent notions; and he is suppressed
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by the strong arm of the law. It is not absolute right that he
has transgressed; it is changeable law, the recorded idea of the
stronger party. The principle is the principle of war. That our
government is a democracy is no escape; even more obviously
than in other forms of government its sanctions are the arms of
the powerful party. As long as a people believe in the divine
right of kings, the king's law has the likeness of an absolute
standard; but in a democracy the laws are avowedly but the
impositions of the stronger by virtue of their strength, and the
principle of war stands naked, unclothed with illusions. Nothing
but anarchy, indeed, is consistent with the ideal of peace. That
nothing has ever proved so inconsistent with the reality of
peace throws, perhaps, an illuminating ray upon the human
plight.
It is in the nature of this human plight that whatever ultimate truth may be, it has not yet been attained. Men and
nations have to struggle along in actual life with the best approximations of it they can conceive. When the approximations of
two peoples come into conflict there is no absolute standard of
truth for them to appeal to. If the clash is reached in sudden
passion they may, indeed, be willing to arbitrate when the
sudden passion cools. Or on deliberation they may consent to
compromise when their approximations seem not worth the
sufferings of war. But to suppose that the time has come when
men will never again deliberately find wrong unbearable, injustice
intolerable, right not worth fighting for, is to argue oneself not
only ignorant of history, the only basis for judgment as to matter
of fact, and ignorant of human nature, but guilty of that shallow
idealism that is vicious because it has no relation to reality.
Such idealism is based, not on reality, but on vague feelings that
it would be "nice" if it were realized. But life is not nice. To
feel that times have changed, that human nature is better than
it was twenty years ago (when we had our last war) is to be
optimistic. It is, alas, to be typically American. But could
there be, in truth, a more threatening, more potent, blacker
pessimism than lies in the supposition that the time has
passed when men shall ever again care enough for truth and
right and justice to offer their lives in the hope that they may
prevail?
In point of fact the world has not come to that pass. If two
peoples have arrived at the point of war, each deliberately willing
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to fight for its cause, there can be for them no stronger belief, and
no higher standard to appeal to. And no threat can stay them,
for no threat can be so harsh as the death they have staked.
There is no recourse but war. Even here, indeed, we may conceive an arbitrator; but he must be so strong as to deprive the
fighti:i:;,g peoples of all hope of making their ideas prevail. And
that arbitration would itself be a violation of the ideal of peacean imposition by force of the arbitrator's own idea upon the
weaker peoples. It is because there is no absolute standard of
truth that humanity must struggle to make its own best ideas
prevail. Where those ideas clash there is no decision but the
decision of actuality-maintenance by force.
That such conflicts must needs be arises from the nature of
the human make-up. Wars are not fought over matters of knowledge. There may be battles of the books but they are bloodless
battles. Knowledge is susceptible, so to say, of arbitration. Its
standards are objective, lying in facts outside the passions; its
tenure is in external things and external records. Rather, wars
are waged over moral ideas; that is to say, those ideas which have
to do with human conduct and human desires and human happiness. And moral ideas have their tenure, not in objective
things, but in the human breast. We hold to them with the very
passionate nature that strained to the breaking point, makes
war itself. To decry war is to decry the very intensity with
which we may hold our ideas of good and our ideas of right and
justice. It is to beg of us when the ordeal comes to give them up
rather than to die-to prefer ignominy to death. For war and the
passion for moral ideas are inseparable in a world without absolute
standards. The chance for an idea to prevail, for civilization
itself, is but a fighting chance.
The ideal of peace seems, therefore, scarcely tenable. That
an American should hope for the defeat of Germany because he
loves England, or France, or Russia is wholly rational. That he
should hope for the defeat of Germany because he believes in the
superiority of English or French or Russian civilization is wholly
rational. But just these reasons he has rarely echoed in support
of the reigning animus. To utter them would seem to commit
him to a belief in war. He keeps his love of war for a war against
war. It is needless to point out that this is no different from any
other belief in war-a belief in maintaining a moral idea though
one must fight for it. But I wish to point it out, and to recall the
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inconsistencies of American thinking in relation to the belligerent
countries, and to reassert the shallowness of the ideal of peace,
becau,.se it seems to point to another inconsistency in the American assumption of championship of that cause.
If we can fancy such a thing as universal peace we must fancy
a state of the world in which all nations think alike. Nations do
not go to war over points upon which they can agree. If therefore those points could be extended over all grounds of present
and future differences war would cease. Until then it will
probably not cease. But the promise of that time is not brightened by illogical thinking. There is no uniformity of thought
except through the channels of logic. And though even with
perfect logic a difference in premises wi111ead to diverse conclusions, yet the greatest hope of agreement lies in clear and right
thinking. Illogical thinking is infinite, chaotic, diverse, separative, the source of discord, of injustice, and of war.
America lies outside the heat of conflict. We are at peace
with all the world and remote from danger of clash. All our
external conditions are favourable to our championship of peace.
But within we have neglected the one qualification through
which our ideal could ever be attained. We have not looked
to our clear and right thinking. We have rather been guilty
of mere enthusiasm-of that shallow enthusiasm, moreover,
that lies at the base, not only of war in general, but of just those
useless wars that arbitration might be hoped to avert. We have
been sophomoric. We have not seemed remotely to understand
the long, hard struggle ahead of the nation that should take up
the search for the grail of peace-the self-examination, the selfrestraint, the austere training of the youth, nation wide and
generation after generation, in a uniform discipline of their
thinking, by which alone a nation can hope to bring one day nearer
the time when all peoples should agree. On the contrary we
are even now in the throes of a sweeping revolution in the opposite
direction.
Perhaps the present exhibition of eager credulity, of feeble
thinking, and of jejune enthusiasm is the first large demonstration of the fruits of our modernized training. At all events our
American attitude toward the war is inconsistent with the ideal
in the name of which we have justified ourselves. When the
time comes when we shall see that in the absence of absolute
standards, and in the presence of diverse knowledge and diverse
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thinking, war is humanly inevitable, we may be in the way of
making for a maximum of peace. The first result, I dare say,
if we should experience such a clarification of mind, would be to
give to the German cause a fairer consideration than it has yet
received at our door.
University of Nebraska.
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